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ABSTRACT 
 
Previous studies have tried to make a comparative analysis between the market-oriented 
system and the mixed governance system on the determinants of stock option awards for 
managers; however, these studies exhibit some failures that must be overcome. In 
addition, we note the absence of studies addressing the validity of the agency theory on 
the determinants of equity-based compensation in times of instability or crisis. We used a 
sample of 159 French companies and 203 US companies for the period spanning 2002 to 
2010. The results of the present study support the conclusion that the variables measuring 
the size of the firm, growth opportunity, debt, management and control functions, size of 
the board, and ownership concentration explain the decision to grant equity-based 
compensation, regardless of the sample and period considered. Using a variable 
representing the presence of institutional investors, we show that this type of investor is 
only involved in controlling the leader in the French case, during a period of financial 
instability. 
 
Keywords: equity-based compensation, agency theory, financial crisis, information 
asymmetry 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
In recent decades, equity-based compensation has attracted the attention of 
researchers, academics, and government regulatory agencies. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) suggest that the allocation of shares to the manager demonstrates an 
aspect of corporate governance because these shares convey a personal fortune to 
the manager rather than to the shareholders, which reduces the possibility of the 
managers taking measures against company owners; therefore, allocation of 
shares is a means to mitigate agency problems. 
 
Although research on stock-based compensation continues to proliferate 
(Barkema & Gomes Mejia, 1998; Harvey & Shrieves, 2001;  Ryan & Wiggins 
III, 2002; Rosenberg, 2003; Brown & Lee, 2010; Liljeblom, Pasternack, & 
Rosenberg, 2011), most studies highlight the impact of the new international 
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financial reporting standards 2 "IFRS 2" (Street & Cereola, 2004; Chalmers & 
Godfrey, 2005; Avallone, Quagli, & Ramassa, 2011; Croci, Gonenc, & Ozkanc, 
2012) and the introduction of new laws protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders, namely Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) (Gordon, 2003; Holmstrom & 
Kaplan, 2003; Dicks, 2012), on the decision to grant this type of compensation. 
However, we see a lack of studies that address the validity of the agency theory 
for the determinants of equity-based compensation during periods of instability 
(crisis).  
 
In addition, the studies of Poulain-Rehm (2003), Idi Cheffou (2009), and 
Gallali and Bouras (2012) remain the only comparative investigation between the 
two systems of governance (market oriented and mixed) with respect to stock 
options in particular and equity-based compensation in general. These studies 
attempt to identify factors that may have an impact on the granting of stock 
options in the French market and to compare the results with those of other 
markets, namely the US market; however, this study has some limitations, which 
we attempt to overcome in this paper.  
 
On the one hand, the authors make comparisons with other investigations 
without considering the difference in the number of companies studied, the 
composition at the sector level, and the period of study. On the other hand, these 
studies have focused only on factors related to the characteristics of the firms and 
the manager and have ignored factors related to governance, specifically the 
characteristics of the board of directors and ownership structure.  
 
Agency theory is the main supporter of the theory of allocation of equity-
based compensation despite the scandals attached to this component. However, 
agency theory explains the widespread use of this type of compensation through 
economic and governance characteristics associated with the firm in an absolute 
manner without taking into account the specificity of the country or the study 
period. Faced with generally issued theoretical predictions of the agency theory, 
we seek to determine whether the factors explaining the allocation of stock-based 
compensation are insensitive to spatial dimension (change of context) and time 
(economic conditions). 
 
This study provides a contribution to the literature in several ways 
through which we attempt to conduct a bidimensional analysis of the predictions 
of agency theory. On the one hand, we attempt to examine the factors that explain 
the allocation of equity-based compensation for the American and French 
markets, and to express the differences that may exist between them. On the other 
hand, we attempt to determine whether the findings of the agency theory in these 
determinants are valid regardless of the economic conditions (stability or 
instability).  
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LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Our study focuses on a comparison between France and the United States. This 
section will be devoted to presenting the characteristics of the governance system 
of these two countries, and the characteristics of equity compensation for each 
country. 
 
According to Moerland (1995) and Charreaux (1997), the Anglo-Saxon 
system, of which the United States is a prototype, is characterised by a highly 
dispersed ownership structure, a low presence of institutional investors where the 
functions of management and control are combined for one leader, and 
supervision of the latter occurs mainly through the financial market. In addition, 
countries adopting this system of governance are characterised by strong 
protection of minority investors, unlike the French context, which is a prime 
example of a hybrid system of governance. In the French case, there is a 
separation of the functions performed by the executive; the financial market is 
not well developed compared to the United States, and the ownership structure is 
highly concentrated and characterised by a large presence of institutional 
investors. In this case, the financial market and an investor with greater control 
simultaneously perform the function of monitoring the executive. 
 
Equity compensation, in general, and stock options, in particular, have 
emerged since the 1980s in the United States. However, in France, this practice 
did not truly develop until the mid-1990s, after publication of a series of reports 
on good governance practices such as the Vienot (1995) report, Clement (2003), 
and Association Française des Entreprises Privées (AFEP)-Mouvement des 
Entreprises de France (MEDEF) (2008–2012); these highlight the positive effect 
of managerial ownership on firm value.  
 
A second component of equity compensation, i.e., restricted stock, 
similar to stock options, has emerged in the United States; it has also emerged in 
France, with the 2005 Finance Act, which allows French companies to pay 
employees and executives in the form of share awards subject to performance 
conditions. 
 
In accounting terms, we do not find a big difference in the recording of 
stock options and restricted stock. Indeed, companies are adopting international 
standards (IFRS 2) in accounting for this component of compensation to facilitate 
the international comparison and interpretation of data. 
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THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS  
 
Based on previous work, we can divide the factors into three groups. First, we 
analyse the determinants of economic characteristics of firms and factors related 
to the characteristics of the leader. Next, we present the characteristics relating to 
corporate governance. 
 
Faced with a lack of literature regarding the explanatory factors for 
granting equity compensation, and taking into account the economic situation and 
the context studied, we identify different research hypotheses from the general 
context of agency theory. 
 
Variables Related to the Firm Characteristics  
 
According to Matolcsy, Shan and Seethamraju (2012), companies pay their 
leaders according to their characteristics. Indeed, the awarding of compensation 
is explained primarily through three key ideas: the information asymmetry 
between the principal and the agent, the liquidity problem, and the conflict of 
interest between shareholders and the manager and shareholders and creditors. 
 
Firm size  
 
Numerous previous studies have assumed that firm size affects the probability of 
attributing equity compensation (Uchida, 2006). According to Ryan and   
Wiggins III (2001), large firms have less information asymmetry, as the press and 
analysts frequently report their news. However, a positive relationship between 
the allocation of the equity compensation decision and the size of the firm is the 
origin of agency theory. Indeed, Eaton and Rosen (1983) find that a manager of a 
large firm combines more complex assets resulting in greater difficulty for 
shareholders to monitor the firm's actions.  
 
At the empirical level, results of most previous studies support the ideas 
of agency theory, such as Core and Guay (1999), Harvey and Shrieves (2001), 
and Conyon and He (2012). Hence, the hypothesis to be tested is as follows:  
 
H1: Equity-based compensation is positively related to firm's size. 
 
Liquidity  
 
According to Dechow et al. (1996), Kedia and Mozumdar (2002), and Kim, 
Yasuda and Hasegawa (2012), equity based compensation provides firms with a 
method to preserve liquidity, unlike cash compensation such as salary and 
bonuses, which deplete liquidity.  
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However, the empirical results are mixed. Matsunaga (1995), Yermack 
(1995) and Chen, Liu and Li (2010) failed to find a significant relationship. We 
test the following hypothesis: 
 
H2:  Equity-based compensation is positively related to a firm's 
liquidity constraints. 
 
Growth opportunity 
 
According to Bryan, LeeSeok and Steven (2000), firms with significant growth 
opportunities have a range of possible investment decisions known only by the 
manager, resulting in a rise in information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. One way to overcome this problem is to link the remuneration of 
CEOs to shareholder interests via equity compensation.  
 
Several previous studies provide evidence to support this idea, including 
Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996), Burns and Kedia (1993), Avallone et al. 
(2011), and Van Essen, Otten and Carberry (2012). Hence, the hypothesis to be 
tested is as follows:  
 
H3: Equity-based compensation is positively related to growth 
opportunities. 
 
Debt  
 
Based on the predictions of agency theory, Jensen (1986) suggests that, due to 
contractual payment obligations, the repayment of the debt limits manager's 
discretionary behaviour and attenuates the agency problem. Accordingly, the use 
of debt may even reduce the demand for equity compensation as a substitute for 
managerial control (Qin, 2012).  
 
Empirical tests have yielded inconclusive results. Indeed, some studies 
confirm the relationship of substitutability between debt and equity 
compensation, such as Ittner, Larcker and Meyer (2003), Uchida (2006), 
Liljeblom et al. (2011) and Qin (2012). However, other studies failed to find a 
significant relationship between these two variables (Bryan et al., 2000; Chen            
et al., 2010). We test the following hypothesis: 
 
H4:  The highly leveraged companies attribute less compensation in 
the form of shares to their managers.  
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Noise (ROA-equity returns)  
 
Bryan et al. (2000) suggest that noise in a performance measure is an important 
factor in determining a manager's compensation contract. Empirically, the noise 
variable is measured by the variance of earnings returns or equity returns (Shin, 
2005) or the ratio between the two variances (Lambert & Larcker, 1987; 
Holthausen & Larcker, 1991).  
 
From the assumption of substitutability, the agency theory assumes that 
when a performance measure is noisy, the firm gives less weight to this 
measurement to determine CEO pay packages (Shin, 2005). Yermack (1995) and 
Bryan et al. (2000) confirm this idea when they find that the noisiness in 
accounting data (stock) is positively (negatively) associated with equity 
compensation. From the above we can formulate the following hypothesis: 
  
H5a:  There is a negative relationship between equity compensation 
and noise in stock returns.  
 
H5b: There is a positive relationship between equity compensation 
and noise in earnings returns. 
 
Variables Related to Manager Characteristics  
 
Manager age   
 
The problem horizon is another facet of the agency theory used to explain the 
granting of equity to a manager. Indeed, the leader approaching retirement 
refuses all projects characterised by high initial expenditure in research and 
development because this type of project would be profitable only after a long 
period of time.    
 
In addition, according to Qin (2012), equity-based compensation is a 
form of managerial ownership; therefore, the prediction of the agency theory is 
an alignment mechanism of interests, which leads to decision horizon problem. 
The equity-based compensation is an alignment of interest mechanism, designed 
to alleviate decision horizon fears. Therefore, there is a tendency towards 
intensive use of equity compensation in compensation contracts of the older 
executives, especially those approaching retirement age (Gibbons & Murphy, 
1992). 
 
Empirically the results are inconclusive. First, Yermack (1995) and 
Oreland (2008) did not find a significant relationship; second, David, Kochhar 
and Levitas (1998), Tzioumis (2008) and Van Essen et al. (2012) found a 
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negative relationship between age and the likelihood of the manager to allocate 
equity-based compensation. From the theoretical findings, we can formulate the 
following hypothesis:  
 
H6:  Firms allocate more equity-based compensation to an older 
manager.  
 
Manager tenure 
 
According to Ryan and Winggins III (2002) a manager characterised by a long-
term period in the executive office raised more shares when the stock option 
awards or bonus shares would have a minimal effect on the alignment of interests 
between shareholders and the manager. However, based on the entrenchment 
theory, the research also shows that the manager can take advantage of his 
seniority within the firm to receive excessive compensation, including equity-
based compensation (Lippert & Moore, 1994). From the agency theory 
assumption, we can formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H7:  There is a negative relationship between manager tenure and 
equity-based compensation. 
 
CEO duality 
 
Based on the proposals of agency theory, Petra and Dorata (2008) confirmed that 
the governance structure and, in particular, the dual functions of a manager affect 
the composition of executive compensation. Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) 
shows that the title of Chairman of the board of directors is an honorary award 
for officers who have achieved satisfactory results during an initial trial period. 
Consequently, the manager, who has two functions (CEO and chairman of the 
board), has demonstrated his ability to create shareholder value, and therefore 
these interests are most likely aligned with those of shareholders (Ryan & 
Wiggins III, 2002; Qin, 2012). 
 
However, the agency theory assumes that the functions of management 
and control must be separated to improve the level of control (Vigliano & Barré, 
2010); therefore, in the case of dual functions, decisions reside with the same 
person, which creates an agency problem. Thus, based on this finding we can 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H8:  The grant of equity-based compensation as a way to mitigate 
conflicts of interest is positively related to CEO duality. 
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Variables Related to Corporate Governance 
 
We will determine corporate governance through the features of the board; we 
will also determine ownership structure in general and the concentration of 
ownership and the presence of institutional investors in particular. These two 
forms of ownership have been chosen because of the divergence between the two 
countries, as we previously mentioned in the section related to the presentation of 
the legal and institutional framework. 
 
Board of director characteristics 
 
Whatever is the direction of the previous governance literature (agency theory or 
managerial power theory), mechanisms related to corporate governance have an 
influence (positive or negative) on the probability of granting shares to the 
manager.  
 
Based on agency theory, a board of directors characterised by small size 
(Yermack, 1996; Ryan & Wiggins III, 2002; Shin, 2005), a high degree of 
independence (Jensen, 1993; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), and the presence of a 
compensation committee (Conyon & He, 2012) contribute to a strong governance 
structure that reduces the need for equity compensation (Qin, 2012). In fact, these 
mechanisms ensure enhanced managerial monitoring; in this case, the integration 
of equity-based compensation does not have a great effect on the decisions made 
by the manager. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H9:  Firms with small board size, a high percentage of independent 
directors, and the presence of a compensation committee 
attribute less equity-based compensation. 
 
Ownership structure 
 
In terms of ownership structure, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), a 
dispersed ownership cannot possibly provide effective supervision of the leader's 
behaviour. Indeed, Benz, Kucher and Stutzer (2001) suggest that none of the 
minority shareholders has an incentive to participate in the monitoring process. 
Therefore, the interests of shareholders are dispersed and difficult to coordinate. 
Thus, the higher the concentration of shares, the more shareholders are motivated 
to exercise effective control to encourage the manager to make creative value 
decisions. Faced with this situation, firms have no incentive to allocate equity 
compensation, because the interests of both parties are aligned (Bryan et al., 
2000; Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). 
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In addition to the concentration of ownership, the identity of the 
shareholders of the company may also restrict or enable managerial power over 
the practice of executive compensation (Van Essen et al., 2012). According to 
Useem (1996), one of the most important changes in corporate governance over 
the last 20 years is the dramatic increase in the participation of institutional 
investors in the capital of the company. 
 
Although investor status does not provide some investors more formal 
power than other investors, institutional investors often have substantial interests. 
Therefore, this type of investor has a tendency to more actively control, and may 
be able to limit executive power in the implementation of the compensation 
policy (Hartzell & Stark, 2003; Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) emphasise that the shareholders/manager agency 
problem may be mitigated by a number of control mechanisms such as the 
presence of institutional investors. Therefore, the proportion of shares held by 
institutional investors is a sign for effective control of the leader that allows a 
reduction in agency costs and, consequently, a low allocation of equity 
compensation. Therefore, based on these agency theory findings, we can 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H10a:  The allocation of equity compensation as a means to mitigate 
conflicts of interest is negatively related to ownership 
concentration. 
 
H10b:  The allocation of equity compensation as a means to mitigate 
conflicts of interest is negatively related to the presence of 
institutional investors. 
 
 
SAMPLE AND DATA SOURCES  
 
Our initial sample for the US case is composed of 300 large US companies, based 
on the market capitalisation criterion, and belonging to the S&P 500 stock market 
index. For the French case, our initial sample consists of 250 French companies 
listed on the Paris Stock Exchange and is part of the CAC All-Tradable stock 
index (ex SBF 250). 
 
In the two samples, we have eliminated American and French financial 
companies with 16% and 14% of the total sample, respectively. We also excluded 
companies with defects in their accounting information and related governance 
data, 16% of the total sample for the US firms and 22% for the French firms.  
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 Finally, our study focuses on a sample composed of 203 US companies 
and 159 French companies for a period of study from 2002 to 2010, with 1827 
and 1431 observations (firms/year), respectively. For both cases, our sample 
consists of the service sector (30%), the industrial sector (26%), the consumer 
goods and information and communication technology sectors (18% each); the 
health sector represents only 8% of all companies selected.  
 
The data relating to compensation, including stock options and restricted 
stock granted to the executive, as well his age and the period of occupation in the 
chief executive position, were collected from two main sources. In fact, in the US 
and French cases, information is collected respectively from the Compustat 
ExecuComp database and manually from annual reports. 
 
Variables related to accounting data are assembled using Compustat 
North America and Compustat Global databases. 
 
 Variables related to corporate governance (board characteristics, the 
presence of a compensation committee, and ownership structure) are collected 
manually from Proxy Statement DEF14a and the Thomson Institutional 
Ownership database for the US case and reference documents for the French. 
 
 
MODEL AND SELECTED VARIABLES  
 
Several studies attempt to determine why some firms allot equity-based 
compensation more than others. However, the results remain inconclusive 
because of the diversification in the study period, measurements of selected 
variables, and estimation models. 
 
To eliminate the factors that may affect the results in our study, such as 
the composition of the sample, the diversification of variables, measures and 
multiple econometric methods, we perform a comparison under the same 
conditions for both cases  (France vs. US) and two periods ( stability vs. crisis). 
 
To test the above hypotheses, we use the Tobit model regression to 
determine the factors that may affect the decision to award equity-based 
compensation to the manager1.
 
 
Equiy.Comp = α0 + α1Size + α2Opport + α3No.Div + α4Lev + 
α5Noise.ROA + α6Noise.Ret + α7Age + α8Tenure + α9Dual + α10Bd.Size 
+ α11Indep.Dir + α12Comp.Comm + α13Concent + α14Institu.Own +               
∑ φi.seci + ∑ φiYi + ζ        
(1) 
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The dependent variable (Equity.Comp) is the natural logarithm of          
(1 + values of stock options and restricted stock received by the manager in year 
t)2
 
 (Brown & Lee, 2010; Guillet, Kucukusta, & Xiao, 2012; Kim et al., 2012). 
For independent variables: 
• Size: Firm size, measured by the logarithm of total assets; 
• Opport: Growth Opportunity, measured by the market to book ratio; 
• No.Div: Non dividend distribution3, binary variable that is 1 if the firm 
does not distribute dividends and 0 otherwise;  
• Lev: The leverage of the company, measured by the ratio of total debt 
and book value of total assets; 
• Noise.ROA: Noise in earnings returns, calculated by the standard 
deviation of return on assets (ROA) as measured by (Net income/Total 
assets) over the past five years compared to year t; 
• Noise.Rent: Noise in stock returns, calculated by the standard deviation 
of return on stocks over the past five years compared to year t;  
• Age: Manager's age in years;  
• Tenure: Number of years during which the manager filled the position of 
manager; 
• Dual: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the manager is also the board 
chairman and 0 otherwise; 
• Bd.Size: The size of the board measured by the number of directors;  
• Indep.Dir: The percentage of independent directors on the board; 
• Comp.Comm: A dummy variable that equals 1 if the company has a   
committee and 0 otherwise; 
• Concent: The concentration of ownership measured by the percentage of 
shares held by the three largest shareholders; 
• Institu.Own: The presence of institutional investors as measured by the 
percentage of shares held by institutional investors;  
• Sec: A dummy variable indicating the presence of sector effect; 
• D: A dummy variable indicating the period effect. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of selected variables 
 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% 
The table shows the descriptive statistics for the 159 French companies and 203 US companies for the period of 9 years from 
2002 to 2010. The dependent variable is calculated as the natural logarithm of equity-based compensation (1+ value of stock 
options and restricted stock valued by the Black-Scholes formula) received by the manager, in U.S. dollars, we used the annual 
average exchange rates USD / Euro for each year [2002: 0.9411, 2003: 1.1286, 2004: 1.2417, 2005: 1.2436, 2006: 1.2545, 2007: 
1.3687, 2008: 1.4648, 2009: 1.3892, 2010: 1.3244]. The independent variables: Size: The logarithm of total assets, Opport: The 
market to book ratio, No.Div: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company does not distribute dividends and 0 otherwise, Lev: 
The ratio of total debt and book value of total assets, Noise.ROA: The standard deviation of return on assets over the last five 
years compared to the year t, Noise.Rent: the standard deviation of stock returns over the past five years compared to year t, 
Age: Manager's age in years, Tenure: Number of years during which the manager filled the position of manager, Dual: Dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the manager is also the board chairman and 0 otherwise. Bd.Size: Number of directors, Indep.Dir: The 
percentage of independent directors in the board, Indep.Dir: The percentage of independent directors in the board, Comp.Comm: 
A dummy variable that takes 1 if the company has a compensation committee and 0 otherwise, Concent: The concentration of 
ownership measured by the percentage of shares held by the three largest shareholders, Institu.Own: The presence of institutional 
investors as measured by the percentage of shares held by institutional investors. 
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INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS  
 
Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of variables used for both samples. The 
dependent variable (Equity.Comp) is measured by the natural logarithm of the 
value of equity-based compensation. The average of this variable for US 
companies is 1.511, well above the average for French companies, which is 
0.262. 
 
 
This difference is explained by the distribution of the total remuneration 
received by the manager. Figures 1 and 2 show that the remuneration package of 
French managers is composed primarily of cash compensation whereas in the US, 
the equity-based compensation represents approximately half of the total 
compensation throughout the study period (2002–2010).  
 
In the French case, we note that the percentage of equity compensation 
increases for the years 2006 and 2007; this finding is explained by the new Act in 
2005 authorising French managers to receive free shares subject to performance 
conditions (restricted stock units). During the years 2008 and 2009, which 
corresponds to the period of crisis, the equity-based compensation began to 
decrease. This reduction allows us to infer that during periods of instability, 
French managers prefer certain cash remuneration over random stock-based 
compensation, in which their awards are subject to performance conditions.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of compensation (cash and equity) of French managers 
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Figure 2. Distribution of compensation (cash and equity) of American managers 
 
We divided independent variables into three groups: economic variables 
related to the characteristics of the firms, variables related to the characteristics of 
the manager, and variables related to the board. We note that, for the variables 
related to the characteristics of the firms, the differences in the averages are not 
high, except for variables measuring firm size and growth opportunities; these 
have a large and statistically significant difference. 
 
For variables related to the characteristics of the manager, the average 
ages of French and American leaders are, respectively 55 and 56 years. On 
average, the French manager holds the post for 10 years, whereas the US the 
manager remains for seven years. This result is evident, because the American 
managers' market is very active compared to the French. Therefore, there is a 
high probability of change in incompetent managers when the agency problem 
arises between the agent and the principal. 
 
In addition, this difference is explained by a high percentage of 
independent directors; 76.8% in the US compared to only 36% in France. 
According to the "CEO Succession Practices" report published in 2012 
(Schloetzer, Tonello, & Aguilar, 2012), strong independent directors could 
motivate the board to revoke the manager who performs below expectations. 
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We note that there is a large difference in the average for US Companies 
compared to French companies for the variables related to the presence of 
independent directors and the presence of the compensation committee because 
US law is very rigid compared to French law. Indeed, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the NASDAQ authorities require the boards of 
US Companies to have independent directors as a majority and to have a 
compensation committee. 
  
For the variable measuring the size of the board, we see that the average 
for the two samples is very close but is greater than the optimum value 
determined by Jensen (1993), which assumes that the board should be composed 
of seven or eight directors. 
 
We note that there is a large difference in average for variables 
measuring the concentration of ownership and institutional investors (26.34% and 
22.83%). This difference is expected because of the divergence in the governance 
system for these two countries. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the Pearson correlation coefficients for the French 
and American companies, respectively. Note that in both cases the correlation 
coefficients between variables are weak. Thus, we can deduce that there is no 
multicollinearity problem in the model analysis. 
 
The dependent variable (Equity.Comp) results showed a significant 
association for both cases, between this variable and the explicative variables 
(Size, Age and Indep.Dir). For the variables Lev, Noise.ROA, Noise.Rent, 
Tenure and Bd.Size, the significance of the correlation coefficient with the 
endogenous variable (Equity.Comp) depend on the selected sample. There is an 
absence of significant correlation between the variable measuring the growth 
opportunity (Opport) and the dependent variable (Equity.Comp), regardless of 
the sample. 
 
Interpretation of Results  
 
The empirical results of the paper are presented and discussed in this section 
including a bidimensional analysis of the validity of the agency theory. First, we 
verify the above hypothesis for two samples of different systems of governance 
and explain the differences that may exist between the two samples. Second, 
given the importance of the financial crisis, we verify whether the agency theory 
is enabled during periods of instability, in terms of equity-based compensation. 
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Table 2 
Pearson correlation matrix (French firms) 
 
Notes: This table shows the correlation coefficients between the variables used for a sample of 159 French firms for the period 
from 2002 to 2010. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
 
Table 3 
Pearson correlation matrix (US firms) 
 
Notes: This table shows the correlation coefficients between the variables used for a sample of 203 US firms for the period from 
2002 to 2010. 
*** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10%
Comparative Analysis between the Two Countries 
 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (1). Column (1) presents the 
results of all data related to French and American firms to determine whether US 
companies attribute more pay to equity-based compensation compared to their 
French counterpartsiv
 
.  
Columns (2) and (3) show the results of estimating equation (1) for two 
separate samples. Note that the coefficient (US indicator) is positively significant 
at 1%. Indeed, most American companies reward their managers in the form of 
equity-based compensation more than the French, which has been verified in the 
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descriptive statistics. This result can be explained by the difference in the system 
of governance between the two countries. 
 
Table 4 
Results of regression of the determinants French and American firms 
 Pooled France US 
US indicator 2.396***(9.81)   
Size 0.152***(3.21) 0.3927***(4.50) 0.058*(1.81) 
Opport 0.133**(1.95) 0.4648***(4.44) 0.053**(2.54) 
No.Div 0.016(1.36) 0.8951**(1.71) –0.033(–0.41) 
Lev –0.512***(–4.27) –0.428*(–1.69) – 0.777*(–1.91) 
Noise.ROA 0.245(0.29) 0.3464(1.24) –0.580(–0.46) 
Noise.Rent 0.765***(3.87) –0.111(–0.51) 0.209***(6.02) 
Age –0.034***(–2.99) –0.046***(–3.01) –0.004(–0.30) 
Tenure –0.0154(–1.02) –0.029(–1.07) –0.140(–0.23) 
Dual 0.178(1.48) 0.247**(2.02) 0.084**(1.99) 
Bd.Size 0.060**(2.05) 0.124***(3.02) 0. 497***(3.56) 
Comp.Comm 0.957***(3.68) 0.793***(2.78) –0.144(–0.23) 
Ind.Dir 0.278***(3.21) 0.180**(2.09) 0.178**(2.14) 
Concent –1.642*** (– 3.60) –0.183***(–3.04) –0.930*(–1.71) 
Institu.Own 0.154(0.63) –0.099***(–3.21) 0.1527(0.54) 
Constant –1.907***(–2.43) –1.767***(–4.89) –3.021**(–2.40) 
Sector Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood –5939.7849 –1636.392 –4228.8195 
N 3258 1431 1827 
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
The table presents the results of the regression of the determinants of award of equity-based compensation for 
the different cases (Pooled, French and American) for the period from 2002 to 2010. 
 
According to Charreaux (2009), the control of the manager is lower in 
the case of a market-oriented system of governance (US). Conversely the French 
context is characterised by a mixed system in which control is stronger and 
occurs mainly in the ownership structure. Consequently, faced with less active 
control in the Anglo-Saxon system, equity-based compensation is a way to align 
interests between the agent and the principal. 
 
In addition, this difference is explained in legal terms because France is 
unlike the US; in France, the allocation of equity compensation has only been 
recently regulated by the enactment of Nouvelles Régulations Economiques 
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(NRE) or New Economic Regulations 2001, which only allows the allocation of 
stock options to executives. Free shares subject to performance conditions 
(restricted stocks) are regulated by the Finance Act of 2005, which states that the 
restricted stocks previously reserved for shareholders, are available to company 
management employees. 
 
For the variable indicating the size, we note that there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship at the 1% level for the French and 10% level 
for the US, which confirms most of the results of previous research, such as 
Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010), Bryan et al. (2000), Avallone et al. (2011) and 
Gallali and Bouras (2012). According to Vlittis and Charitou (2013), large firms 
require more talented managers and are more difficult to control, which makes 
equity-based compensation a most important mechanism for reducing the agency 
problem for these types of companies. 
 
Consistent with our expectations and previous works such as Du and Lin 
(2011) and Van Essen et al. (2012), firms with high growth opportunity distribute 
more equity-based compensation. In fact, the market to book ratio represents a 
proxy for growth opportunities, and is positive and statistically significant at 1% 
regardless of the sample used. According to Ozkan (2007), it is difficult to 
observe the actions of the manager in a high growth opportunity business as 
equity-based compensation is one of the solutions to facilitate manager control. 
 
The leverage ratio (Lev) is negative and significant at the 10% level for 
both cases, supporting hypothesis 3. According to Qin (2012), highly leveraged 
firms have a high risk of bankruptcy while debt holders can influence these 
companies. Therefore the use of equity-based compensation is reduced because 
these payments encourage the manager to make risky decisions to increase 
shareholders' wealth and the manager's wealth. In addition, according to Jensen 
(1986), the debt repayment is a way to monitor and limit the manager's discretion 
in cash flow. An important leverage is a substitute for the use of equity-based 
compensation for executive control. 
 
For variable (No.Div), which represents a proxy for the liquidity of firms, 
the results are inconclusive and depend on the chosen market. Indeed, in France, 
stock-based compensation is a way to maintain liquidity (positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level), which is consistent with results found by Chen et al. 
(2010). This situation differs from the American context where the decision to 
award equity-based compensation is not related to the liquidity constraint (non-
significant relationship between the value of stock-based compensation and 
variable [No.Div]), but is a mechanism of increasing control. In the American 
context firms are less controlled than their French counterparts due to the 
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difference in the governance system between the two countries and, in particular, 
the dispersion of capital forcing shareholders to exercise effective control.  
 
The variable indicating the noise in stock returns (Noise.Rent) is related 
to the stock market, unlike other variables, which explains the non-converging 
result for the two samples. On the French market level, the noise linked to stock 
returns is not a factor in the allocation of equity compensation, unlike the US 
market, where the variable (Noise.Rent) is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Indeed, in the US context the financial market is a mechanism to monitor the 
manager. The result found is consistent with the previous work of Core and Guay 
(1999) and Shin (2005). Indeed, Breedman and Viswanathan (1998) suggest that 
high noise in stock returns is a sign of information asymmetry between the 
shareholder and manager while the probability to adopt equity-based 
compensation plans for the manager is essential to reduce this asymmetry. 
 
Considering the manager's age, we reject the horizon problem hypothesis, 
which proposes that the manager approaching retirement benefits from more 
compensation in the form of stocks. In the American case, we failed to find a 
significant relationship as expected by the result obtained by Oreland (2008). For 
the French case, managers approaching retirement prefer certain compensation 
rather than random remuneration based on shares, in accordance with the work of 
Ryan and Wiggins III (2002) and Gallali and Bouras (2012).  
 
An explanation of the negative effect of age on stock-based 
compensation could be that the long-term nature of this type of compensation 
reduces the likelihood of benefit from this compensation for executives entering 
retirement (Tzioumis, 2008). Another explanation for this negative relationship is 
developed by Eaton and Rosen (1983), who suggest that risk aversion may 
increase with the age of the leader and therefore, can influence the preferences of 
the individual for risky compensation and primarily equity-based compensation. 
 
We find that US and French companies with a manager who is also 
Chairman of the board have more equity-based compensation (positive and 
statistically significant at the 10% level). This finding is in accordance with the 
agency theory, which states that if the management and control functions of are 
combined in one person, agency problems arise. According to Ryan and Wiggins 
III (2002), this conflict led to the need for equity-based compensation because the 
monitoring by the board is likely to be less effective. 
 
For the variable indicating the size of the board, we found a positive and 
statistically significant relationship at 1% for both samples. This result is 
consistent with the study of Ozkan (2007) and confirms the finding of agency 
theory, which states that large board size can cause communication and 
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coordination problems among members. Given this situation, the board becomes 
ineffective in controlling the manager, while the equity-based compensation can 
be a substitute to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of the manager. 
 
The presence of the compensation committee is not a mechanism for 
monitoring the equity-based compensation of the manager. The inefficiency of 
this committee is due to its composition. In the US case, our results converge 
with the results of the study of Qin (2012), where the mechanism is not a 
determinant that can have an influence on the decision to award compensation in 
the form of stocks. Indeed, in this context, the compensation committee is 
composed entirely of independent directors with a reduced probability for the 
manager to take advantage of excessive compensation in shares, as these 
independent directors have no relationship with the manager. In addition, this 
type of administrator can be served by other committees such as the audit 
committee, while the control over executive compensation and performance-
based compensation is not effective. Based on the foregoing, the role of the 
compensation committee is not conclusive and cannot be detached from the 
efficiency or inefficiency of the mechanism. 
 
In France, according to Abate, Jaclot and Petit-Perrin (2000), the role of 
the compensation committee remains low because, on the one hand, the manager 
may be a member of this committee and, on the other hand, the law only requires 
a minimum of one third of independent directors on the committee. The legal 
requirement explains the positive relationship (statistically significant at the 1% 
level) in accordance with the work of Conyon and He (2012).  
 
In addition, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship at 
the 5% level between equity-based compensation and the presence of 
independent directors on the board for both cases, according to the results 
obtained by Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001) and Croci et al. (2012). This 
result is inconsistent with the predictions of the agency theory made by Fama and 
Jensen (1983), who argue that the presence of independent directors is likely to 
have an incentive to ensure effective control. Accordingly, based on the 
hypothesis of substitutability of governance mechanisms, there is a low 
probability of assigning stock-based compensation as a means of reducing the 
manager's opportunistic behaviour when firms are characterised by a large 
percentage of independent directors. Our result confirms the idea proposed by 
Ozkan (2009), who reported that independent directors do not fulfil the function 
of control and reduction of managerial entrenchment. However, the main 
function of such directors is to improve firm performance thus, they have a 
strategic role to strengthen the control of the manager. 
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For the variable measuring the concentration of ownership, there is a 
negative and statistically significant relationship at the 1% threshold in the 
French case and 10% in the American case. Indeed, if a high concentration of 
ownership is characterised by a highly dispersed ownership structure, holding a 
large fraction of actions is a device that reduces conflicts of interest between the 
principal and the agent. Faced with this situation, companies distribute under 
equity-based compensation as a means of aligning interests between these two 
parties (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
 
At the institutional ownership level, our result confirms our theoretical 
findings in which institutional investors for the French context succeed in 
exercising more control over the executive. Indeed, there is a negative and 
statistically significant relationship at the 1% threshold in this case. However, in 
the American case, our result fails to find a significant relationship. We can 
deduce the importance of this type of investor in controlling the behaviour of the 
French leader compared to the possibility of opportunism in the US case. Indeed, 
in the United States this investor has a more strategic role and intervenes in the 
process of decision making more than controlling officers in France; this explains 
the absence of a significant relationship between this category of investor and the 
allocation of equity compensation as a probable device of managerial control. 
 
Comparative Analysis for the Two Periods 
 
To check whether the hypothesis derived from agency theory in terms of stock-
based compensation are valid regardless of the period of study for a set of 
samples (159 French companies and 203 US companies), we will divide our 
sample in two sub-periods. The interval of instability (market crisis) corresponds 
to the years 2002 to 2008 and 2009, where these years are characterised by high 
volatility in the S&P 500 and CAC All-Tradable indices due to the computer 
crisis and the subprime crisis. The second interval is in other years where there 
has been stability in the S&P 500 and CAC All-Tradable indices.  
 
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the two periods. On the level of 
the variables related to the characteristics of the firms, the results for the variables 
measuring firm size, growth opportunity, and leverage are similar and do not 
depend on the period of stability or instability. In fact, these variables are 
consistent with the prediction of the agency theory and are not sensitive to 
changes in economic conditions. 
 
During the crisis period, the variable (Noise.Rent), where firms with high 
noise in stock returns distribute under stock-based compensation and the manager 
prefers the accounting performance pay, performs contrary to what is expected. 
In fact, according to Hugon (2010), variability of stocks during this period is 
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high, which leads to high information asymmetry between shareholders and the 
manager during this period; therefore, managerial ownership and, in particular, 
equity-based compensation is one way to reduce the problem of information 
asymmetry. 
  
Table 5 
Results of regression of the determinants of equity-based compensation for 
periods of stability and instability 
 
 Pooled (stable period) Pooled (instability period) 
US indicator 1.411***(5.97) 3.767***(8.61) 
Size 0.112***(2.70) 0.210***(2.68) 
Opport 0.326***(5.51) 0.235**(2.00) 
No.Div 0.186(1.09) –0.023(–0.07) 
Lev –1.064**(–2.55) –0.739**(–0.97) 
Noise.ROA 0.493(1.50) –0.020(–0.92) 
Noise.Rent 0.115(0.63) 0.174***(4.71) 
Age – 0.019(1.53) –0.043**(–2.01) 
Tenure –0.009(–0.89) –0.020***(–2.92) 
Dual 0.199**(1.99) 0.559**(1.76) 
Bd.Size 0.077***(3.14) 0. 812***(5.73) 
Comp.Comm –0.770***(–3.14) 0.134***(2.92) 
Ind.Dir 0.314***(3.87) 0.161***(2.76) 
Concent –0.146***(–3.47) –0.175**–(2.09) 
Institu.Own 0.099(0.47) –0.196***(–3.38) 
Constant –2.15***(–3.01) –3.158**(–2.12) 
Sector Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes 
Log likelihood –3568.2938 –2195.603 
N 2172 1086 
          
Notes: *** Significant at 1%, ** Significant at 5%,  
The table presents the results of the regression of the determinants of award of equity-based 
compensation for periods of stability and instability. 
 
Another explanation is rooted in the signal theory. According to 
Guimbert and Vallat (2001), during the period of instability, an allocation of 
stock-based compensation is a signal to maintain the trust and interests of 
investors in the company's long-term state; the variability of the stocks is 
occasional and limited to the crisis period.  
 
For the entire sample, regardless of the holding period, the decision to 
allocate equity-based compensation is not explained by illiquidity or high noise 
in earnings returns. 
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At the level related to the characteristics of manager variables, we find 
that, during the period of stability, the age and experience of the manager and the 
cumulative functions are not determinants in the decision to award compensation 
based on shares. During the crisis, older managers become more risk averse and 
prefer short-term compensation; therefore, agency theory's assumption of 
managerial horizon is rejected during a period of instability. 
 
The variable (Tenure) behaves counter to the prediction of the agency 
theory. Agency theory states that, when the tenure in the executive position in the 
firm increases, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and the 
probability of allocating equity-based compensation as a mechanism to reduce 
conflicts of interest is low. During the crisis, our results support the findings of 
entrenchment theory. Indeed, Core and Guay (1999) and Tzioumis (2008) assume 
that a long period of occupation by a manager allows him to take root in the firm 
and have some influence on the board of directors. Brown and Lee (2010) assume 
that this mechanism is ineffective in controlling managers' actions during the 
crisis period, which increases the possibility of managerial entrenchment, and 
enjoying excessive compensation, especially in the form of shares. 
 
For variables (Dual) and (Bd.Size), we found a positive and statistically 
significant relation at the 1% level similar to the work of Qin (2012), regardless 
of the period chosen. This finding is in accordance with the agency theory finding 
we have previously developed. 
 
 The result obtained in the presence of the compensation committee is 
mitigating and depends on the period analysed. On the one hand, in a context of 
stability, the compensation committee is effective in controlling the manager            
(a negative and statistically significant relationship at the 1% level between the 
variable [Comp.Com] and [Equity.Comp]). This result is consistent with agency 
theory, which assumes substitutability controls the manager; this explains the 
negative effect of the presence of the remuneration committee on equity-based 
compensation (Chang, Labban, Gapin, & Etnier 2012). On the other hand, during 
the crisis period we find a positive and statistically significant relationship at the 
1% level. Therefore, during this period, the compensation committee fails to 
control equity-based compensation received by the manager, which confirms that 
during this period the members of the compensation committee and members of 
the board have a more strategic role than controlling the executive in general and 
the remuneration of the executive in particular (Brown & Lee, 2010).  
 
Variables related to the percentage of independent directors on the board 
are ineffective in controlling the manager; their presence is contrary to what is 
provided by Fich and Shivdasani (2005). Regardless of the time (stability or 
crisis), such directors may serve on several committees within the firm (audit 
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committee, compensation committee), which leads to overlap in the directors' 
functions and therefore, weakens the control actions taken on the manager.  
 
In general, at the economic variables' (related to the characteristics of 
firms) level, the agency theory is validated regardless of the time when the 
sample was selected; the exception is variables measuring the liquidity of the 
company, noise stock returns, and earning returns.  
 
Regarding characteristics related to the manager, with the exception of 
the variable (Dual), we found results similar to that provided by agency theory; 
the assumptions derived from agency theory and applied to other variables 
measuring the age and tenure period depend on the sample and the economic 
conjuncture. 
 
Regarding variables related to the characteristics of the board, we first 
demonstrated that the board size is ineffective in controlling the American and 
French manager, during the two sub periods. This result is similar to agency 
theory's assumption of. Thus, the compensation committee is effective only 
during the period of stability, which challenges the disciplinary role of directors 
during the crisis. Finally, independent directors do not have a supervisory role, 
but rather a strategic role in both French and American contexts and for a period 
of stability and crisis. This result is contrary to what is provided by agency 
theory. 
 
The variable for measuring the concentration of ownership is a negative 
and statistically significant relationship at the 1% threshold for the stability 
period and 5% for the period of instability. Indeed, the holders of a large 
percentage of shares exercise greater control over the executive to eliminate 
opportunistic behaviour; these investors are unable to diversify their portfolios 
because of the huge amounts expended by these investors to hold many titles. 
 
The presence of institutional investors during the period of financial 
stability has a strategic role in strengthening control over the executive, which 
explains the non-significant relationship between this category of investors and 
the allocation of share-based compensation as a device of control reinforcement. 
 
For the period of financial instability, which is characterised by a lack of 
confidence in the financial market, there is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship at the 1% relationship. Indeed, institutional investors, due to 
important participation in companies, are more interested in controlling the 
executive to avoid the possibility of the extraction of private benefits that can 
lead to negative consequences for the company and for the wealth associated with 
institutional investors. 
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CONCLUSION  
 
The objective of developing optimal compensation contracts in general and the 
allocation of equity-based compensation in particular, is to align manager actions 
with shareholders' wishes. This type of compensation is a major issue in the 
debate between researchers and organisations; regulations attempt to explain why 
firms continue to allocate stock-based compensation despite several scandals 
related to such compensation. Although this study is a continuation of previous 
studies that have tried to make a comparative analysis between the market-
oriented system and the mixed governance system on the determinants of stock 
option awards for managers, we tried to go beyond certain limits. In addition, this 
investigation was one of the first that analysed the validity of the agency theory 
relative to two markets characterised by a different system of governance and for 
two different periods (stability and instability). 
 
A two-dimensional analysis of the validity of the agency theory for a 
sample of 159 French companies and 203 US companies for the period from 
2002 to 2010 leads us to conclude that only the variables measuring the size of 
the firm, growth opportunity, leverage, duality (combining the functions of 
management and control), the size of the board, and the ownership concentration 
explained the decision to grant equity-based compensation regardless of the 
sample and period considered.  
 
Although this study tries to provide a contribution to the literature for 
previously untreated periods (validity of the theory of agency during the crisis for 
two systems of governance), it would be interesting to do a comparative study 
between three systems of governance (American, French, and German-Japanese 
model) without limiting the range of the crisis to the period of high fluctuation in 
stock market indices. 
  
 
NOTES 
 
1. We used a Tobit model because 31% of the total sample did not attribute 
remuneration in shares. The endogenous variable does not take values below 
0.  
 
2. Calculated using the Black and Scholes (1973) taking into account any 
payment of dividends. 
 
3. According to Yermack (1995) and Tzioumis (2008), the non-distribution of 
dividends is a proxy for the liquidity constraint of the firm.  
 
4. We integrate a dummy variable (US indicator), taking value 1 if the firm is an 
American company, 0 otherwise.   
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